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Jan., 1954

DICTA

REVISION OF WATER AND IRRIGATION
STATUTES
HATFIELD CHILSON, of the LovelanL Bar

I was requested to report to the Water Section on the changes
resulting from a revision of the statutes, so far as the same pertain to the statutes on water rights and irrigation.
Before going into the various changes, I think it would be
well to briefly remind you of the purpose of the revision.
In the 1951 Session, the Legislature passed an act for a revision of the statutes. In this act, in addition to setting up the Revision Committee providing for a Revisor of Statutes, the Legislature provided:
In the course of collating, compiling, editing and
preparing such statutes, the Revisor of Statutes, under
the supervision and direction of the Committee, shall
adopt a uniform system of punctuation, capitalization and
wording; eliminate all obsolete and redundant words;
correct obvious errors and inconsistencies, eliminate duplications and laws repealed directly or by implication; correct defective section structure in arrangement of the
subject matter of existing statutes; clarify existing laws
and such other similar matter as the Committee shall deem
proper. All of the foregoing shall be done in such form
and manner as to preserve the intent, effect and meaning of any and every such statutory provision.
This directive of the Legislature will, I think, explain practically all of the changes in the water rights statutes as a result
of the revision.
As you know, the 1953 Revised Statutes is not merely a compilation of the statutes but is in effect the law of the State of
Colorado. The 1953 Legislature, in enacting the Colorado Revised
Statutes of 1953, provided as follows:
The statutory law of the State of Colorado of a general nature as corrected, harmonized, collated, edited, revised and compiled in the certified Official Report of the
Committee on Statute Revision is hereby enacted as the
positive and statutory law of a general nature of the
State of Colorado.
Since the Revised Statutes, upon their publication, will be
the law itself rather than a compilation of the law as set forth
in the various Session Laws, the Chairman of the Water Section
thought it advisable that the changes made by the Statutes Revision Committee and adopted by the Legislature should be reported
at this meeting.
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The work of the Statutes Revision Committee and the Revisor
of Statutes made it relatively easy to check the changes which
have been made, for after each section of the Revised Statutes
the Revisor has noted the changes which have been made in each
section, or if no change was made, he so indicated.
It would serve no good purpose for me to attempt to go
through the various changes section by section. The value, if any,
of this report, I think can be best accomplished by classifying the
changes and giving certain specific examples.
The changes generally follow the directive of the Legislature
in 1951 and may be classified as follows:
1. The elimination of redundant words.
2. Correction of grammar, punctuation and sentence structure.
3. Changes to make references to previous sections and statutes more definite.
4. Changes to conform with Civil Service Amendment, Administrative Code and other legislation adopted after the passage
of the original sections.
5. Changes to coordinate various sections.
6. Repeal of sections which are obsolete or which had been
superseded by subsequent legislation.
THE ELIMINATION OF REDUNDANT WORDS

Changes of this type can best be illustrated by the change
made in Section 8 of Chapter 90, 1935 C. S. A. This section originally read, "Upon the refusal of the owners of tracts of land or
lands through which said ditch is proposed to run, to allow of its
passage through their property, the person or persons desiring to
open such ditch may proceed to condemn and take the right of
way therefor." (Italics supplied.) This was re-written to read
as follows: "Upon the refusal of the owners of tracts of land
through which said ditch is proposed to run, to allow its passage
through their property, the person desiring to open such ditch
may proceed to condemn and take the right of way therefor." The
two sections are exactly the same except in the original section
where it states, "the owners of tracts of land or lands," was rewritten to eliminate the words, "or lands," and later in the original
section where it says, "the person or persons desiring to open
such ditch," was changed to read, "the person desiring to open
such ditch." Obviously there is no change in the meaning of the
section, and the section was re-written to eliminate the redundant
words, "or lands" and "or persons."
This is typical of the changes to eliminate redundant words,
and in my casual checking of the changes to eliminate redundant
words, I found no instance which occurred to me that any change
in meaning had resulted.
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CORRECTION OF GRAMMAR, PUNCTUATION AND
SENTENCE STRUCTURE

This class of change consists largely of eliminating a string
of separate sentences which had been hung together by the word
"and," and separating them into separate sentences. In
several
instances proviso clauses which were hung onto the end of a section, following a semi-colon, were changed into separate sentences.
There are many changes of punctuation and grammar. Not being
a professor of English or grammar, I will have to take the word
of the Revisor that these changes are an improvement. Nevertheless, I found no instances where I felt the substance of the statute
had been changed or effected.
CHANGES TO MAKE REFERENCES TO PREVIOUS SECTIONS
AND STATUTES MORE DEFINITE

A good example of this is found in Section 11 of Chapter 90,
concerning the obligation of the owner of a ditch to permit others
to enlarge it, and which orginally read, "No person or persons having constructed a private ditch for the purposes and in the manner
hereinbefore provided, shall prohibit or prevent any other person
or persons from enlarging or using any ditch by him or them
constructed in common with him or them, upon payment to him
or them of a reasonable proportion of the cost of construction of
said ditch." (Italics supplied.)
This section of the statute wherein it states, "and in the manner hereinbefore provided," refers to a previous section of Chapter
90. In order to make the reference to the previous statute more
definite, this section was re-written to read in part as follows:
"No person or persons having constructed a private ditch for the
purposes and in the manner provided in Section 147-3-5, shall prohibit or prevent," etc. The reference to Section 147-3-5, of course,
is the section of the Revised Statutes which is referred to in the
original Section 11. In other words, throughout the revision, wherever reference is made to previous sections or previous legislation
or to other statutes, the Revisor has made this reference definite
by setting forth the specific section or sections of the Revised
Statutes which are referred to.
CHANGES TO CONFORM WITH AMENDMENTS AND LEGISLATION
ADOPTED AFTER THE PASSAGE OF THE ORIGINAL SECTIONS

From time to time, over a long period of years, the Legislature has enacted statutes pertaining to the appointment of a State
Engineer, his deputies, Irrigation Engineers, Water Commissioners, etc. Many of these statutes were passed prior to the Civil
Service Amendment, an?, of course, in those instances where the
statutes were in conflict with the Civil Service Amendment, the
statute was superseded. The Revisor has re-written those sections
so that they now conform with the Civil Service Amendment. For

DICTA

Jan., 1954

example, the statute providing for the appointment of a State
Engineer, provided for his appointment by the Governor to serve
for a period of two years until his successor was appointed and
qualified. The State Engineer is now under civil service, and consequently the statute was re-written to provide that the Governor
should make the appointment in accordance with and subject to
the terms of the Civil Service Amendment.
Similarly, there were many statutes which provided for the
receipt and expenditure of funds, which were superseded by the
Administrative Code, and the statutes have been re-written to be
consistent with and comply with the Administrative Code. For
example, one statute provided that certain funds which should be
received should be paid to the State Treasurer. Under the Administrative Code, they are now paid to the Department of Revenue,
and the change was accordingly made.
Several changes were made in nomenclature. For example,
the persons performing the duties of what is now known as the
Irrigation Division Engineer, were originally referred to in the
statutes as Division Water Superintendents. To make the statutes
consistent, the Revisor has designated all such persons by their
proper title as Irrigation Division Engineers.
CHANGES TO COORDINATE VARIOUS SECTIONS

An example of this class of change is in Sections 131 and 132
of Chapter 90. Section 131 provides that any ditch company delivering water for pay shall keep water in the ditch from April
first until November first of each year. Section 132 provides that
the owner of any canal or ditch shall have the ditch ready to receive
water by April 15th of each year. The Revisor of Statutes changed
the date in Section 132 to April first to be consistent with the date
of April first used in Section 131.
REPEAL OF SECTIONS WHICH ARE OBSOLETE OR WHICH HAD
BEEN SUPERSEDED BY SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATION

By the revision of the statutes there were many sections of
Chapter 90 which were repealed. I will not attempt to give you
in any detail what these sections pertain to, but a few examples
are as follows:
Sections 34 to 39, which relate to the Commissioners for the
Upper Colorado River Compact, and which were superseded by
an act passed in 1937. The same repeal provisions pertaining to
the Commissioners of the La Plata River, Lai amie River, Rio
Grande River, and others.
Sections 227 to 231, relating to the State Engineer, because
they are now governed by civil service law.
Sections 356 to 358, which were passed in 1891 for the survey
of Mesa County State Ditch, which was neither located nor built
and is obsolete.
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From a casual inspection of these various sections which were
repealed, I found nothing objectionable.
I might mention the chafige made by the Revisor in Section
79 of Chapter 90. Section 79 is the section of the statute authorizing the appropriation of water for storage. The construction
of this section was involved in the case of People v. Hinderlider,
90 Colo. 505, in which the Court held that a proper construction
of this section included the insertion of the word, "thereafter," in
the statute. Consequently, although the statute originally read,
"Persons desirous to construct and maintain reservoirs for the
purpose of storing water, shall have the right to store therein any
of the unappropriated waters of the state not needed for immediate use for domestic or irrigating purposes," the Supreme Court
stated that it should read, "the right to store therein any of the
unappropriated waters of the state not thereafter'needed for immediate use." Consequently, the Revisor of Statutes re-wrote the
section to include the word "thereafter" in accordance with the
Supreme Court's construction. This change, together with a few
changes in combining sections, appear to be the most radical
changes in the revision, and from my own inspection of the changes
I do not feel that the revision has changed the substance or meaning of the statutes as they existed prior to the revision.
However, I can conceive that some one or more of you, when
studying a particular problem under particular facts and circumstances, may come to the conclusion that some one or more of these
changes has changed the substance of one or more of these statutes.
Let me say, however, that it is my own opinion that the Revisor
has done a most excellent and painstaking job in attempting to
comply with the Legislature's mandate insofar as the water and
irrigation statutes are concerned. Assuming that the same thought
and attention was given to all of the statutes, and I am sure it
was, the Revisor and his Committee have accomplished a monumental task.

MY FATHER'S MISTRESS
EVERETT E. SMITH

Every lawyer, single or married, has a mistress-his profession. As people say, the law is a jealous mistress. I have occasion
to know. My father was a lawyer,. and his views on nearly every
subject were colored-I will not say distorted-by the whispered
persuasions of his mistress.
My father's professional duties permitted him the companionship of art (as well as literature), a boon denied to many busy
attorneys. There was a string attached, however; that his appreciation of works of art should be mixed with such speculations as
whether a particular statue should be considered a chattel or a
fixture. Thus, the contemplation of Rodin's. Thinker in weighty
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thought would lead to an absentminded comment that a heavy
statue of George Washington had been held real rather than personal property in an early New York case.
A client who paused to admire a print of Daumier which
decorated my father's law office might be rewarded by a generous
reference to the part which etchings created by Prince Albert
and Queen Victoria had played in the development of the law of
privacy. Whistler had produced masterpieces of painting, of course,
but he also had performed nobly in the witness box when crossexamined by an English advocate in a libel action brought against
the famous author and critic, John Ruskin. The critic had called
the artist impudent in asking 200 guineas for one of his paintings.
My father did not wholly share a friend's lament that the art
of Leonardo Da Vinci scarcely is represented in this country. He
was reminded of an interesting litigation concerning a painting
which the owner claimed was done by the hand which gave the
world the Mona Lisa. A well known art dealer had challenged that
claim in an interview with a newspaper reporter. In the action
for damages brought in New York by the enraged owner against
the dealer, the jury disagreed, but the judge took advantage of
an opportunity, which my father would have relished, to write
an essay giving his opinion on the law of the case.
My father's attitude toward art was not a personal idiosyncrasy merely. Other lawyers, to my knowledge, make the same bows
to their mistress when admiring, say, a portrait of a lovely lady
by Gainsborough. An incident which happened many years ago
illustrates this. Father and I were visiting a friend who practiced law in another city. Our host showed us the unfinished portrait of his daughter. There were a few remarks about the artist
and the picture's promised likeness to the subject. Then the two
good friends began to warm their passions in a dispute whether
the contract for the painting was for the sale of materials or for
work and labor.
Father was an inveterate visitor of museums and art galleries. It is only fair to say that he knew of the Barnes Foundation
and the Frick Collection before their names appeared in the law
reports. While Father's interest in such institutions did not depend on their contributions to legal lore, it certainly was heightened
by such circumstances. Justice Holmes' comparison of the Smithsonian Institution to the ark of the covenant intrigued him. The
litigation over the Smithsonian's Gellatly Collection enhanced the
delight which he always had taken in its enviable paintings by
Ryder and others.
When Justice Holmes wrote, in one of his renowned dissents,
"We have not that respect for art that is one of the glories of
France," he was speaking as one lawyer to another. The lavish
homage demanded by the lawyer's mistress, his profession, scarcely
permits a courtship of art.

